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For anyone who reads a little of the international press, it is relatively easy to understand that world opinion is very critical of the coronavirus management carried out by Pedro Sánchez's government of Spain. A reaction that was late, management that was enormously ineffective and inappropriate centralization of a state which defines itself as the most decentralized in Europe have undermined the prestige of the Spanish executive. Add to this, whether we like it or not, the fragility of the economy, unable to keep up with its fellow EU members in responding to the pandemic, and with the Sánchez cabinet preferring to focus on publicising measures which consisted of numbers with many zeros and which ended up being much smaller and without any translation into immediate solutions for the self-employed or owners of small businesses, as we saw last week with the fiasco of the social security contributions.

Spain has no reserves with which to take on an emergency like the current one, nor even the day-to-day management of the state, without increasing its public deficit. It has been losing international credit for many years with endless corruption cases which have finally sullied even the monarchy, and it spent the boom years on pharaonic works like the state's radial high speed rail network from Madrid to all of Spain. As a corollary, it has been offering lessons to central and northern Europe, forgetting that Angela Merkel is who she is and one day you may need her.

And that day seems to be coming. Having, it seems, lost the battle for the coronabonds which Spain and Italy supported - since there will be no EU consensus on the matter - it is very likely that Pedro Sánchez will be facing a dilemma already experienced by his predecessor Mariano Rajoy: to ask or not to ask for rescue by the EU. Unlike Rajoy, he will have to take the path of requesting it: otherwise he will not be able to rescue the Spanish economy, which will have two of its motors, tourism and services, literally seized up. When this arrives, Europe is not going to indulge the wasteful Spanish.

What will the Sánchez-Iglesias government do then? Will it be able to hold on, or will it burst at the seams? Will it cope with having to go against central tenets of its electoral programme? I see a lot of people in Madrid convinced that this will not be possible and that, in the end, the path of the new "Moncloa pacts" proposed by Sánchez is nothing more than an element of escapism in his vision of the game. To tangle everyone up in it a little, in order to socialize the errors which, in part, have been made by the Spanish government alone.