The Catalan independence movement has not found the best way to make the self-criticism that has been necessary after it proclaimed the Catalan Republic and then did nothing to bring it to practical fruition. Or, to put it in another way, no-one has known how to express the great merit of the decision made by the Puigdemont-Junqueras government: avoiding a situation where the final push to independence could involve human deaths, which it would then be blamed for having produced. Was it an impossible scenario, that of extreme violence by the Spanish state, as the unionist parties are now exclaiming wildly? Is it, simply, the "victim mentality" of the Catalan independence supporters that has been let loose after their "failure"? On the contrary: it should be borne in mind that ever since Madrid started to consider the independence phenomenon as a serious threat, a key objective in its political, police, judicial and media strategy has been to uncover a presumed violent side of the movement and, if that was not possible, to manufacture one. Fortunately, this has not happened.
This is not just a matter of rhetoric. Words that are used and complaints that are made create “reality”. And the complaints made by the Public Prosecutor's Office that have seen pro-independence leaders and government ministers sent to prison, accused of rebellion or sedition - offences that relate to situations of violence which in no case took place - are the maximum expression of the attempt to construct the image of the “violent Catalan”. In the clamorous failure of this strategy by the Spanish state resides one of the great victories of the Catalan independence movement.
The nervousness of Spanish unionist politicians Rajoy, Rivera, Sànchez et al in the face of the independence leaders' affirmations that Spain had threatened “deaths in the streets” if they moved forward with the declaration of the Republic shows up the extent to which the amount of “legitimate” violence - known and unknown, explicit and implicit - used to repress Catalan independence, that is, the violence factor of the state, makes the unionist leaders steadily more uncomfortable as the race gets underway for the Catalan elections on 21st December.
The amount of violence used by the Spanish state to repress Catalan independence makes unionist leaders steadily more uncomfortable as we race towards the elections
But in the last few days, the independence movement has fallen into the error of stating the obvious: that, with the Catalan Republic proclaimed or half proclaimed, its government was incapable of assuming the control of its territory (which meant replacing Spanish authority and police/military force) and that, therefore, it was not in a position to stand up to the level of violence that the Spanish state could activate to crush the republican revolt. I don't know whether, as both Marta Rovira of Catalan Republic Left (ERC) and president Puigdemont have said repeatedly, the level of repression that the state was considering was the maximum possible –deaths in the streets. But for me it is not impossible to imagine that it could have reached this point, given the police actions seen on the day of the referendum and Spain's fear that independence would go ahead. Given the insinuations made about deploying the army in Catalonia, publicly stated on many occasions, whether by Spanish defence minister Cospedal, or ex vice president Alfonso Guerra. On the other hand: is there anyone who imagined that, effectively, the Catalan government was going to do something different from what it actually did? Did people really think that president Puigdemont would order “loyal” members of the Mossos police force to confront the Spanish National Police and the Civil Guard, or that he would encourage ordinary people to do this, to go from passive to active resistance, assuming all risks, that is, that people would die?
One has to be very irresponsible or very mean-spirited - or perhaps, simply overcome by reality - to blame the heads of the Government for not having brought to fruition independence "come what may", because they were unable to accept that the worst case scenario, that of the loss of human lives, could come true. Among other reasons, because a hypothetical “full revolution” was in no way a guarantee of anything in terms of international recognition, but rather the contrary. Donald Tusk warning Rajoy that force does not provide an argument, was an unambiguous message, certainly, in the sense that Europe would not accept the “resolution” of the Catalan problem through the violence of the Spanish state - but it was not synonymous with the idea that Europe would accept and recognize the Catalan Republic. With deaths or without deaths.
Tusk warning Rajoy about the violence of the state was not synonymous with the idea that Europe would recognize the Catalan Republic
Why was the Republic not brought into effect? This question should stop being an obsession for the independence movement. It is not a matter of begging forgiveness for not having gone further, I believe, after seven years of massive mobilizations in the street without even so much as a broken rubbish bin. It seems to me an error that, to respond to its most intransigent sector - or perhaps the sector most incapable of accepting that things are never as simple as when eloquently imagined on paper - the pro-independence leaders, among them those who are exiled and imprisoned, have to justify that the Republic has not been brought to fruition because they did not want to assume the risk of deaths. Of course they don't! The decision made does not seem to me in any way comparable to an act of cowardice - curiously, the criticisms on these grounds from the most intransigent pro-independence areas coincide with the ridicule being aimed at the movement by unionism's biggest trolls - but rather it is an exercise of patriotism, public responsibility and common sense. And this is true, even if the independence movement were able to assume (while rejecting the truth of) the most wretched scenario imposed by the Spanish state: that of assuming the blame for the consequences of violence that was in reality only practiced by Spain! But it is precisely here that one finds the great differential factor and the greatest source of legitimacy of the independence movement: its peaceful and inclusive character, both actively and passively, and in all scenarios. Absolutely all of them.
The independence movement does not cause deaths nor does it allow them to occur. Not even when it has the goal in sight.
The independence movement - and this is also in the best tradition of Catalanism - does not cause deaths nor does it allow them to occur. Not even when it has the goal in sight. While the Spanish state has seemed willing to defend its unity at any price, those wanting independence from Spain have refused to cross the red line, even to reach independence. This is not a cause for national shame but rather an act of intelligence. And an indisputable asset and a value. Both political and ethical. Sometimes, as well as democracy, we need to practice something called ethocracy.